the years that precede the war. Since combat situa tions are separated by longer peri ods of peace time, the inter vals between wars need to be exploited to ensure that airpower is ready when the need arises again.
This arti cle intro duces an original con struct to explore the rela tion ship of the key ele ments of airpower and to create a better un der stand ing of the fac tors nec es sary for the most effec tive employ ment of airpower in com bat. This construct-the Airpower Trin ity, consist ing of the ory, technol ogy, and prac tice-is derived from the concept of the Clau ze witz ian Trin ity. Af ter an in tro duc tion of the Air power Trinity, the evolu tion of these key ele ments is reviewed. This review reveals the cri te ria and circum stances required for bal ance among the three. Finally, it provides a look into the future of airpower, explor ing how the balance can be maintained in peacetime and exploited in war.
The art of employing troops is that when the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him.
-Sun Tzu 5 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998 The Clausewitzian Trinity and Airpower
The first theo ries and prin ci ples of air power, the newest military instru ment, flowed natu rally from the exist ing warfare theory, written pri mar ily by such land power theorists as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Largely as a response to World War I, the de vel op ment of airpower began in earnest to en able direct strikes on the enemy's ability to wage war by leap frog ging con ven tional ground bat tles. At the same time, ironically, Clause witz's princi ples were criticized, primar ily by Lid dell Hart, for causing this bloody and costly war. However, Clausewitz's reputa tion was never se ri ously hurt be cause his ba sic con cepts of war fare are not only valid, but time less-par ticu larly the concepts embod ied in his trinity. He defined the essence of warfare through a trin ity comprised of pri mor dial vio lence and pas sion, chance and prob abil ity in flu enced by crea tiv ity, and an in stru ment of pol icy sub jected to rea son alone. 1 The Clausewitz ian Trinity, depicted in sche matic form in fig ure 1 , is a con struct used at the National War College to illus trate these three elements-the passion, the reason, and the chance of war-and the asso ci ated links among them.
The inter ac tion among these three ele ments, as repre sented by the connect ing ar rows, de picts the criti cal re la tion ship that cre ates a "para doxi cal trin ity" of these domi nant ten den cies. Clausewitz states:
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. 2 Ac cord ingly, they shape the battle field; if one element gets out of balance, then, as Clause witz warns, war has the tendency to spi ral out of control. He uses the metaphor of three mag nets to main tain the nec es sary balance: "Our task there fore is to de velop a theory that main tains a bal ance be tween these three ten den cies, like an ob ject sus pended be tween three mag nets."
3 War was al lowed to spi ral out of con trol in World War I as the element of pri mor dial vio lence and pas sion overwhelmed the ele ment of rea son, which should main tain war as sub or di nate to icy. pol GROUND 7 three magnets to maintain the neces sary bal ance: "Our task therefore is to develop a the ory that maintains a balance between these three tenden cies, like an object suspended be tween three mag nets."
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3 War was al lowed to spi ral out of con trol in World War I as the ele ment of pri mor dial violence and passion overwhelmed the ele ment of rea son, which should main tain war as subor di nate to policy.
Clause witz fur ther iden ti fies the ele ments: the pri mor dial violence mainly concerns the peo ple; the chance and probabil ity embod ies the commander and his army (in the generic mili tary sense); and the rea son is the re spon si bil ity of the govern ment alone. 4 The arrows (and specifi cally the direc tion of the arrows) graphically display the rela tion ship and inter ac tion critical to maintain ing this balance. The War subor di nated to policy and subject to reason tenet is where po liti cal ob jec tives are de fined by the gov ern ment; the link to the Chance and probabil ity in flu enced by creativ ity (the military) is that mili tary strategy is shaped by politi cal objec tives. This rela tion ship between the military and the gov ern ment is de fined pro foundly by Clause witz's decla ra tion that "the first, the su preme, the most far-reaching act of judg ment that the statesman and commander have to make is to estab lish by that test the kind of war on which they are embark ing; nei ther mistak ing it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." 5 Al though people are inher ently a part of all the ele ments, pub lic opin ion (the peo ple's will) in flu ences the govern ment and justi fies the ef fort re quired to achieve the po liti cal ob jec tives. Clause witz's best-known quote, "War is merely the continua tion of policy by other means," links the reason to the vio lence . Policy is set by the gov ern ment and should sub or di nate war to rea son. The "other means" is violence, and in that ele ment, pas sion can cause peo ple to dis re gard rea son. As will be dis cussed later, these two ele ments and their rela tion ship got out of bal ance dur ing the Viet nam War. Just as wit nessed in this conflict, the people's will definitely influ ences both the military and the govern ment-a very critical rela tion ship for success.
Thus, the Clausewitz ian Trinity depicts the nec es sary and critical rela tion ships that link to gether the three elements of the govern ment, the peo ple, and the mili tary to keep war in bal ance. Main tain ing this bal ance re strains war, a stated-if not al ways prac ticed-goal for both politi cal and military leaders follow ing World War I. The people's will, one of the hardest factors to predict correctly, will more likely remain strong and positive when war is restrained by main tain ing the neces sary balance. Airpow er's ca pa bil ity, when used to its maximum poten tial, can be a primary factor in maintain ing the nec es sary balance in the Clausewitz ian Trinity. The govern ment, and thus the military, could ex ploit airpower at the strate gic level. It prom ises an improved chance of victory with fewer casu al ties through its in her ent ca pa bili ties such as speed, flexibil ity, and ma neu ver in a new di men sion.
Many of Clausewitz's key concepts, such as con cen tra tion of force, cen ters of grav ity, unity of command and ef fort, the cul mi nat ing bat tle, and the moral and physi cal as pects of war, were re flected in air power the ory. Lid dell Hart's in di rect approach is particu larly suited to airpow er's capa bil ity. After the protracted bloodshed of World War I, airpower theory promised speed, not just to and on the battle field, but, more signifi cantly, to victory. But, if the advo cates push theoreti cal promises too far in front of practice and technol ogy, as in World War I, air power can not live up to its de ci sive po ten tial.
The Airpower Trinity: An Initial Construct
Clause witz's Trinity defines the es sence of war; the Airpower Trinity defines the es sence of airpower through the critical (and para doxi cal) rela tion ship between the ory, technol ogy, and practice. Figure 2 , in an initial con struct, draws a paral lel between these two trini ties. The as so ci ated links nec es sary to bal ance these elements and provide airpower with maximum poten tial (center) will be added in a subse quent figure. Clausewitz's Trin ity deals with politi cal and psycho logi cal fac tors such as rea son, pas sion, and crea tiv ity; these factors are also embod ied in the Airpower Trinity and exert similar influ ences. Crea tiv ity, for exam ple, can "open up new doors" in the devel op ment of new technolo gies, spur new concepts for the practice of em ploy ing new technolo gies, and conceive of a new the ory for the use of air power. Lead er ship and people-criti cal and neces sary in gre di ents to employ airpower to its maximum poten tial-are among the other factors that per vade the trin ity. Fi nally, ex pe ri ence is par ticu larly im por tant to the devel op ment of em ploy ment practices and is an excel lent com ple ment to reason.
Like the univer sal ity of Clausewitz's prin ci ples, the key elements compris ing the Airpower Trin ity are ap pli ca ble to other serv ices and forms of warfare. Land and sea warfare de pend on the blend ofthe ory, tech nol ogy,and prac tice as well. The proper rela tion ship and evo lu tion is similarly critical to the maximum use of these military instru ments in a joint cam paign. Al though this ar ti cle does not ex plore the concept, a logical exten sion would be a "Joint Force Trinity" construct of these elements, with the "essence of war" at the cen ter. This would be help ful for the in te gra tion of new and advanced technolo gies into weapon and support systems across the spec trum of joint military force.
The Airpower Trinity: The Relationship among Theory, Technology, and Practice
As with the inter con nect ing rela tion ships in Clausewitz's Trinity, the rela tion ship among the three elements is the critical part of the Air power Trin ity. Fig ure 3 adds the con nect ing links that define this rela tion ship. The inter ac tion among these three elements, as repre sented by the connect ing arrows, re veals a paradoxi cal rela tion ship: each ele ment can evolve inde pend ently at its own pace, yet critical, depend ent rela tion ships ex ist among them. Clausewitz's statement above about the real ity of the rela tion ships among the three ten den cies of his trin ity is di rectly ap pli ca ble here. The ory, technol ogy, and prac tice are "deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their rela tion ship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbi trary rela tion ship between them would conflict with real ity to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."
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6 Accord ingly, the Air power Trinity does not ignore this critical re la tion ship as each element evolves and seeks to define the major factors neces sary to main tain the proper rela tion ships.
The The ory ele ment pro vides rea son (par al lel to the element in the same posi tion in Clause witz's Trinity) to the Airpower Trinity as it defines the promise and poten tial of airpower. It also drives tech nol ogy by estab lish ing the require ments of the capa bil ity; addi tion ally, it presents a neces sary concep tual frame work to the Prac tice element. Doctrine and theory, obvi ously, are not exactly the same, but doc trine is de rived from the ory and prac tice. Hence, note its relative posi tion in the Airpower Trinity and the "back-andforth" inter ac tion of doctrine, theory, and prac tice. The debat able posi tion of doctrine in the trin ity comes from our lack of fo cus on it in the past. Gen Ronald R. Fogle man, former USAF chief of staff, explains that the "Air Force tradi tion ally has not thought a lot about doctrine." He further states that the early airmen leaders used theory to develop em ploy ment prac tices and doc trine and "had doc trine in their heads-they lived it and passed it on." 7 Conse quently, doctrine has not always been written. Recently, the Air Force set up a doctrine center to help formu late and inte grate doctrine into Air Force op era tions-lev er ag ing the trinity's three key ele ments.
The Tech nol ogy ele ment, through equip ment and systems, provides the capa bil ity to reach airpow er's maximum poten tial. Tech nol ogy, with its foun da tion in sci ence, in her ently in volves rea son, but it also re quires peo ple with creativ ity to produce useful in ven tions. Al though mostly "pushed" by the re quire ments of promis ing theory, techno logi cal advance ments sometimes can push the ory to keep up with emerging ca pa bili ties. For exam ple, as satel lite technol ogy rapidly opens up new oppor tu ni ties for infor ma tion and weapons use, the theory of airpower has been pushed (par ticu larly from the view point of those wearing pilot's wings) to include space and war-fighting concepts in space.
An other factor that affects the devel op ment of technol ogy is the available budget for research and devel op ment (R&D) and procure ment of new systems. Al though not a large percent age of the total life cycle cost for a wing of 72 fighter aircraft, for instance, this "up-front" in vest ment of R&D and procure ment sometimes does not compete well with current readi ness and quality of life budget demands. 8 This becomes a particu larly conten tious issue when the overall budget is declin ing, as it has been in recent years. Conse quently, the available budget to explore new technolo gies has been reduced. When this is combined with the lack of a peer competi tor on the near hori zon, in creased moderni za tion funding to keep our tech no logi cal edge is a dif fi cult po si tion to support. These budget constraints will have a sig nifi cant effect on the devel op ment of the tech nolo gies required for such capa bili ties as space-based weapons, stealth preci sion strike plat forms, and inte grated satel lite and aircraft la ser systems. Addi tion ally, the budget process be tween the Depart ment of Defense (DOD) and Congress can some times re sult in in con sis tent outcomes and lengthy acqui si tion programs. This can lead to sys tems that the serv ices ei ther do not want or have incor po rated but will be out-of-date by the time the system reaches the field. This is another challenge to main tain ing a balance.
Tech nol ogy can become so advanced and com plex that it presses the limits of human ca pa bil ity. This is most evident in the ad vanced cock pits of fu ture fighter air craft. The amount of infor ma tion is so huge and the flow so rapid that the pilot has a more diffi cult time ab sorb ing and proc ess ing it all. This "in for ma tion overload" could marginal ize the techno logi cal advance. Addi tion ally, not only are the physical structures of these fighter air craft be com ing more "stealthy," the air craft can "pull more Gs" (the force of grav ity) than the human body is capa ble of withstand ing. Even as em ploy ment prac tices change to take advan tage of these advances, such as through the use of unmanned vehi cles, the human is still neces sary somewhere "in the loop." This poten tially lim its tech nol ogy. Conse quently, both of these elements must be devel oped in tandem so that they maxi mize their contri bu tion to airpower.
While neces sity fosters inven tion, tech nol ogy also has its lim its. The ul ti mate "high ground" to employ airpower is from space, but satel lites, lasers, and spaceships are not yet ad vanced enough in the op era tional area to do the prac ti cal weapon ized mis sions. The key is that as tech nol ogy advances, it must be through concur rent and inte grated devel op ment with the ory and prac tice. If not, the Airpower Trinity will not be in balance to "feed the cen ter." To gether the ele ments shape airpow er's poten tial. Without this synergy, airpower will not provide its maximum poten tial-the ability to restrain warfare through quick, deci sive, and low-casualty outcomes. The bal ance of the ory, prac tice, and tech nol ogy will be attained only through the lessons of his tory that follow.
Beginning the Journey of Airpower Evolution: World War I and World War II
The evolu tion of the the ory of airpower, the tech nol ogy that enables capa bil ity, and em ploy ment prac tice took time. Each of these elements devel oped indi vidu ally, but there were also natural rela tion ships between them that influ enced this evolu tion. Air power changed the con duct of war im me di ately at the tacti cal level; airpower as a de ci sive factor at the strate gic level took a bit longer to emerge. However, in compari son to the history of warfare, the time frame was rela tively short-about 75 years (from World War I to Desert Storm). And, in several lim ited cases, airpower provided strate gic deci sive ness earlier than that. The challenge, of course, is to ensure that airpower evolu tion con tin ues such that it pro vides its maxi mum po ten tial in future conflicts.
In World War I, appli ca tion of early the ory did not im me di ately make air power a de ci sive factor. Clausewitz, obvi ously, did not ad dress airpower specifi cally, and a transla tion of his theories to this instru ment had not yet hap pened. Since there was no writ ten air power the ory, devel op ment happened con cur rently with prac tice, and, even then, it was not widely dissemi nated. The three ele ments of the Airpower Trinity were not in bal ance. The po ten tial prom ised by the early ad vo cates was way "out in front" of what tech nol ogy could provide. This lack of techno logi cal ca pa bil ity restrained em ploy ment. Dur ing the ensu ing years, airpower enthu si asts such as Giulio Douhet, Gen Billy Mitchell, and Sir Hugh Trenchard addressed air power theory directly-us ing many of Clause witz's concepts of war fare. These men rec og nized that airpower, with its ability to ma neu ver in the new dimen sion of air, was the techno logi cal advance ment to change the face of the World War I battle field, despite these initially limited results. They prom ised that the next war would be differ ent.
In 1. Modern great powers rely on major industrial and economic systems. . . . Disruption and paralysis of these systems undermines both the enemy's capability and will to fight.
2. Such major systems contain critical points whose destruction will break down these systems, and bombs can be delivered with adequate accuracy to do this.
3. Massed air forces can penetrate air defenses without unacceptable losses to destroy selected targets.
4. Proper selection of vital targets in the industrial/economic/social structure of a modern industrialized nation, and their subsequent destruction by air attack, can lead to . . . victory through air power.
5. If enemy resistance still persists after successful paralysis of selected target systems, it may be necessary as a last resort to apply force upon the sources of enemy national will by attacking cities. (Emphasis in original) 9 These prin ci ples seemed also to re flect the pages on "center of gravity" and "national will" in Clausewitz's On War.
10 Moreover, as a founda tion for strate gic bombing during the war, the princi ples reflected the core belief in the de ci sive na ture of air power. In par ticu lar, the statement that the "proper selec tion of vital targets . . . and their subse quent de struc tion by air attack, can lead to . . . vic tory through air power" (princi ple 4) implied that victory could be achieved follow ing this prescrip tion.
How ever, again, the Airpower Trinity was not in balance. The theory derived from the ACTS prin ci ples was valid and proven in later con flicts, but "vic tory through air power" did not occur in World War II. Airpower did make signifi cant contri bu tions-in some bat tles at the tacti cal level; others, such as in the ul ti mate surren der of Japan, at the strate gic level. In prac tice, airpower was a part of the over all campaign in most battles, but it was not employed to utilize its maximum poten tial. The ory re quired air power to be a pri mary and inte gral part if it was to be a deci sive fac tor in the joint campaign. There were some at tempts by joint staffs, most no ta bly the Brit ish joint staff, in opera tions; however, the lack of central ized control of air assets se verely limited effec tive ness and positive im pact. The promises of Douhet, Mitchell, and the ACTS were not fulfilled.
The re al ity of em ploy ment prac tice proved more dif fi cult and com plex than the ory sug gested. Again, tech nol ogy lim ited ca pa bil ity.
Even with the most sophis ti cated bombsight, World War II aviators were unable to deliver the promised preci sion bombing. This capa bil ity was a must to fulfill the ACTS fourth prin ci ple (and promise). Addi tion ally, the "will of the people," a critical rela tion ship in Clause witz's Trinity, signifi cantly affected the balance of the Airpower Trinity as well. Two oc cur rences in the use of air power by the en emy forces reveal the complex nature of bal anc ing theory and practice.
In tended to have a positive effect, the bomb ing of Pearl Har bor and the air strikes on London during the Battle of Brit ain had un ex pected and oppo site effects for the Japa nese and the Germans. In each case, the in tent was to use air power stra te gi cally, to destroy the will of the people to resist. Yet, these bombings solidi fied rather than shat tered public will. In fact, the reac tion of the Ameri can peo ple to the Pearl Har bor bomb ings pushed the waver ing Roose velt ad mini stra tion into the war. Clearly, the lead ers of Ja pan and Ger many did not fully un der stand the na ture of war with re gard to the will of the people. However, an im por tant lesson about employ ment was univer sally learned: air supe ri or ity was a require ment for any success ful opera tion. Still, air power the ory prom ised more than air su pe ri or ity. The good news was that the vi sion of that fully real ized promise could be seen more clearly at the end of the war.
Korea and Vietnam: Limited
Wars, Limited Use
In the Korean and Vietnam limited wars, with their unclear nature and restrained con duct, Clausewitz's Trinity was forced out of bal ance. 11 Po liti cal ob jec tives (rea son) were not prop erly con nected to mili tary ob jec tives and em ploy ment (the other two ele ments). In the Airpower Trinity, tech nol ogy had closed the gap be tween prom ise and ca pa bil ity (for exam ple, jet engines signifi cantly im proved speed, and up graded weap ons deliv ery systems provided more precise bomb ing). But even with this tech no logi cal
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The Vietnam War, also fought in the shadow of the cold war, saw airpower em ployed in a limited and dispa rate fash ion-like the rest of the US military force. Airpower had not been "unleashed" to fully ex ploit its capa bili ties for maximum impact. This was primar ily due to politi cal con sid era tions (White House control of target ing, etc.) that impacted and constrained em ploy ment prac tice-a critical element of the Airpower Trin ity. Also, the lack of central ized control over all the air as sets again di luted the abil ity to maximize the force. Air campaigns like Roll ing Thunder and Linebacker, while ac com plish ing some limited tacti cal success, could not provide a deci sive factor without in te gra tion into an overall joint war effort.
Israeli Success in the Six-Day
War and the Bekaa Valley: Airpower Trinity in Balance
The maximum poten tial of this unique ca pa bil ity is achievable. The success of Is raeli airpower in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Bekaa Valley air campaign in the 1982 Lebanon war showed that airpower could be a deci sive factor. These successes oc curred when the avail able the ory, technol ogy, and practice concepts supported each other in the strate gic appli ca tion of airpower. Airpower had finally ful filled the early promises, albeit on a rela tively small scale. In both conflicts, the Is raeli leaders showed a clear under stand ing of Clause-witz ian theory; the trinity and its link-ages; Lid dell Hart's in di rect ap proach; and the princi ples of surprise, de cep tion, and concen tra tion of forces that airpower could exploit. They also under stood the ele ments of the Air power Trin ity and their re la tion ships.
At 0745 on Monday, 5 June 1967, Israel used the element of surprise (the princi ple of war that is airpow er's strongest advan tage) 1 2 to launch a preemp tive strike at two dozen Arab air bases in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. This precisely timed and coor di nated strike consisted of two 80-minute attacks that destroyed the offen sive poten tial of the Arab air forces. In this first three hours of the war, 387 Arab aircraft were de stroyed, and Egypt's air force, the largest in the Arab world, went from 520 planes to 220. 13 With early air suprem acy, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) could provide timely inter dic tion and close air support that enabled the ground forces to accom plish magnifi cent feats.
Gen eral Hod, commander of the IAF, when asked how it managed such unprece dented success, stated four key reasons: sixteen years of plan ning for the ini tial 80 min utes, good intel li gence about the enemy, flexi ble and cen tral ized con trol of the air assets, and skilled execu tion. 1 4 Although the Is raeli strategy relied heavily on Liddell Hart's theory (when using its inher ent advan tage of surprise, airpower is both the ul ti mate in di rect ap proach and a criti cal force mul ti plier for a numeri cally infe rior mili tary), Clausewitz ian theory was clearly rec og nized (war plans support ing clear politi cal objec tives, and the critical ity of the hu man factor in war). Strate gi cally, Israel knew that victory had to be quick and decisive. 15 Surprise was the key to success; airpower, with its speed, range, flexi bil ity, and abil ity to directly attack enemy centers of grav ity, was the only force that could provide a de ci sive blow. Air power sealed Is raeli vic tory within hours of the first strike. This was the promise of airpower the ory; the avail able tech nol ogy provided the neces sary ca pa bil ity; and the IAF pi lots ex ploited both in their employ ment prac tice. The Airpower Trin ity was in bal ance at this point in time.
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The Is raeli air op era tion over Leba non in 1982, although very limited in scope, ob jec tives, and the number of partici pants, re quires mention in light of the deci sive na ture of airpower for at least three rea sons. First, airpower probably prevented a fu ture war with the abso lute destruc tion of the Syrian forces. Accom plished very quickly and with very few casu al ties, the air war in the Bekaa Valley exhib ited almost per fect employ ment by the IAF in the eight-minute battle. Second, this air cam paign consti tuted the first full-scale test of current-generation American tech nol ogy in tac ti cal aircraft and weapons.
1 6 But, al though there were lessons to be learned about technol ogy of weapons and equip ment, a more impor tant lesson was about air power employ ment prac tices. Hightechnology weapons are required in a realtime electronic warfare envi ron ment, but to be deci sive, airpower still must be em ployed using the basic princi ples of war. Third, it was also about the hu man fac tor in war. In the end, despite diver gent military phi loso phies and more sophis ti cated Ameri can equip ment, the Syri ans were sim ply out flown and out fought by the Is raelis.
Desert Storm: Our Theory, Practice, and Technology Balanced in the Airpower Trinity
In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein boldly stated, "The United States relies on the Air Force and the Air Force has never been the deci sive fac tor in a bat tle in the history of wars." 17 He was right about the United States Air Force up to that time, but he obvi ously was not a student of the evo lu tion of airpower-or, for that matter, of mili tary strat egy. Con se quently, Sad dam lived to re gret his statement. From the first-night reports of F-117s and Tomahawk cruise mis siles striking Baghdad (via live CNN report ing) to nightly preci sion bombing videos, it be came evident that this war was differ ent. The United States was at a point in time when the ory, technol ogy, and practice converged at the right time and place to al low em ploy ment of airpower to its maximum poten tial. The Air power Trinity was in balance and, as such, played a prime role in the balance of the Clause witz ian Trinity. As David Hackworth con cluded, "Air power did a most impres sive job and virtu ally won this war by itself." 18 Based on the objec tives of this war, airpower could not have "won it by itself," but it was the deci sive factor in the quick, low-casualty al lied victory.
While airpower the ory, in general, prom ised the deci sive battle, written US Air Force doc trine was mired in the cold war. 19 The ba sic doctrine manual, Air Force Manual (AFM) Con se quently, approach ing the Persian Gulf War, airpower leaders did not have a written doc trine on which to base a conven tional air cam paign plan. However, they did have un writ ten doctrine that had been devel oped through their many expe ri ences and study of the best concepts of such theorists as Clause witz, Liddell Hart, and, of course, Mitchell and Douhet. Luckily, there were Air Force lead ers, like the early airmen, who understood these concepts of theory and had them "writ ten down in their minds,"Gen Chuck Hor ner, Brig Gen Buster Glosson, and Col John War den to name the most visi ble. Colo nel Warden had laid the founda tion of an air cam paign in his bookThe Air Cam paign: Plan ning for Combat. He led the joint working group that took his European theater plan and built the initial part of the compre hen sive, inte grated Desert Storm air campaign.
These lead ers cer tainly un der stood Clause witz's concept of the center of gravity (see end note 10). War den's modi fied and up dated ver sion of the center of gravity with his five con cen tric rings became the central focus of the air campaign. 21 Gen Colin Powell, com ment ing on Warden's concept at one of the first strategy-planning meetings in August 1990, stated that "Warden's approach could de stroy or severely cripple the Iraqi re gime." 22 It remained the heart of the air cam paign. With initial domes tic public support tenu ous due to a vivid memory of the pro tracted and costly Vietnam War, a quick crip pling of Iraq's war-fighting capa bil ity was re quired. Addi tion ally, the fragile nature of the coa li tion added a further require ment for a quick war, with low loss of allied lives and mini mal collat eral damage. A mandate from the United Nations and our allies-as well as do mes tic public support-gave the United States the op por tu nity to "un leash" air power. To sum up the phi loso phy in true Clause witz ian sense, Gen eral Pow ell ex plained the bat tle plan: "We were using our airpower first . . . to ren der the enemy deaf, dumb, and blind. . . . Our strategy in going after this army is very sim ple; first we are going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it."
23
The air cam paign was car ried out by an employ ment concept of simul ta ne ous and syn chro nized strikes, mass and concen tra tion of forces, surprise and decep tion, outstand ing in tel li gence, and flexibil ity through central ized control-all univer sal princi ples of warfare. As with the evo lu tion of tech nol ogy, these em ploy ment prac tices were perfected over many years. Airpower clearly benefited from a trans for ma tion in the way US forces train for com bat. This was true for the en tire joint arms team. As one Army gen eral of fi cer stated, "We didn't start winning this war last August. We started winning this war ten to fifteen, if not twenty years ago." 24 This applied to Air Force train ing as well.
Doc trine had advanced, not in the written form of AFM 1-1, but in other written forms such as journals and reports. This was supported by changes in employ mentprac tices at large-scale exer cises like Red Flag, which be gan af ter the Viet nam War, and sig nifi cant or gan iza tional changes in flying units in the early 1990s. Finally, probably the key reason for air pow er's de ci sive na ture was the cen tral ized control of all air assets by one com mander, the joint force air compo nent com mander. Through one inte grated air tasking or der for all coali tion air forces, General Hor ner directed air assets to the missions that would provide the most deci sive impact. At long last, the the ory element and the prac tice ele ment were in balance with the tech nol ogy ele ment.
"The technol ogy finally caught up with the doctrine," proclaimed Gen Michael Du gan, former Air Force chief of staff, as he as serted the vindi ca tion of preci sion bombing. 25 Dramatic improve ments in preci sion weap ons and stealth tech nol ogy pro vided the nec es sary means to reach the ambi tious ends of the air campaign. Attack ing the will of the popu lace, while minimiz ing collat eral dam age-once only a promise-was now a real ity. Ad di tion ally, tech nol ogy improve ments in many other areas like commu ni ca tions, sen sors, and aircraft produc tion and mainte nance resulted in supe rior intel li gence and situa tional awareness, nearly flawless syn chro ni za tion of simul ta ne ous missions, very high air craft sor tie rates, and even im me di ate bomb ing re sults sent to lead ers in Ri yadh and Wash ing ton. This mini mized the "Do ver fac tor" (bod ies ar riv ing at Do ver AFB, Dela ware) by re duc ing the loss of Ameri can lives and the "CNN factor" (imme di ate, real-time TV cov er age) by provid ing very success ful target ing video. Airpower provided an overwhelm ing, tech no logi cally supe rior, deci sive force-the Ameri can "way of war" continu ally pro moted by General Powell.
The Future for Decisive Airpower
"Billy Mitchell was right." Hung above the door at USAF's Air Command and Staff Col lege dur ing De sert Storm, this say ing is fi nally more than theory-at least for this war. Airpower can and did provide a deci sive contri bu tion to the fi nal out come of that war. However, now in an other pe riod of peace time, the chal lenge is to keep the elements of the Airpower Trinity in balance for the next war.
In the expected conflicts of today and to mor row, airpower, like land or sea power, can not pro vide the sole means to all ends. De pend ing on the purpose and nature of the con flict-and the intended politi cal objec tives-the relative impor tance and contri bu tion of air, land, and sea forces vary. These forces are intended to work together to achieve the military objec tives. However, even if one of the goals is to move an enemy's army, airpower can provide the deci sive means to this end. Without it, the accom plish ment of that objec tive may be threat ened or require a very high price in terms of lives lost and ma te rial re sources ex pended. To this end, employ ment practices must keep pace with the ory and tech nol ogyad vance ments to ensure that the Air Force fights Powell's "way of war."
United States airpower doctrine (AFM 1-1, March 1992) describes the basic princi ples and tenets for the effec tive appli ca tion of airpower. The unique capa bil ity of airpower to op er ate from the "high ground" means that it can be employed quickly, anywhere needed, against any facet of enemy power. 26 Derived through ex pe ri ence, this cur rent doc trine, dy namic and flexible like airpower, allows for ad vances in tech nol ogy and threats, as well as changes in warfare. It reflects a core belief in the deci sive nature of airpower with the defi ni tion of strate gic air warfare as air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. along with the devel op ment of infor ma tion war fare, will very likely make tomor row's wars quite differ ent from the ones we know. Em ploy ment prac tices and the ory (and doctrine) will become more critical as future tech nol ogy prom ises a capa bil ity to conduct war fare more cleanly-in a precise, limited, al most bloodless fashion-and quickly.
Future Air and Space Operations
This ques tion about whether De sert Storm and the technolo gies employed consti tute a revo lu tion in military affairs (RMA) has been widely discussed. Certainly, these techno logi cal advances resulted in a high-intensity bat tle field, a "hyper war," that was a profound change in the conduct of war. James Fitz sim monds, an Army offi cer writing in a 1995 ar ti cle, de scribed many of the ad vanced tech nolo gies used during Desert Storm that will shape the future battle field:
Advanced sensors and communications now provide much greater information about the control over our own forces. Stealth and precision-guided warheads have reduced significantly the number of platforms and amount of ordnance necessary to destroy individual targets. Conventional weapon lethality has increased, while attrition and collateral damage have been significantly reduced. These developments portend perhaps an entirely new regime of high-technology warfare in the early 21st century. "rela tive U.S. military capa bili ties will un dergo stunning improve ments by 2010." 2 9 Whether we have expe ri enced an RMA or not, one thing on which eve ry one can agree is that the battle field will be differ ent in the fu ture. The CJCS's Joint Vision (JV) 2010 recog nizes this fact and sets the goal of "full spec trum domi nance" by the United States across the range of mili tary op era tions in the fu ture. Gen John Shalikashvili's vision is American ca pa bil ity to dominate any oppo nent-full spec trum dominance is to be the key charac ter is tic for our armed forces to achieve this vi sion. JV 2010 provides the concep tual tem plate to "lev er age tech no logi cal op por tu ni ties to achieve new levels of effec tive ness in joint warfight ing." Each service, through the appli ca tion of new opera tional con cepts, is expected to develop its "unique ca pa bili ties within a joint framework of doctrine and programs." These new opera tional con cepts are dominant maneu ver, preci sion en gage ment, full dimen sion protec tion, and fo cused logis tics. Power projec tion remains one of two funda men tal strate gic concepts of our mili tary strat egy; ac cord ingly, long-range pre ci sion capa bil ity is a neces sary inte gral part of power projec tion and is a "key factor in future warfare."
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Air power will play a signifi cant role in achiev ing this goal. The USAF follow-on strate gic vi sion to "Global Reach-Global Power" was re cently published under the title Global Engage ment: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force. This USAF vision for the first quarter of the twenty-first century states that full spectrum domi nance depends on the inher ent strengths of modern air and space power-speed, global range, stealth, flexibil ity, preci sion, lethal ity, global/thea ter situational awareness, and stra te gic perspec tive. 31 While air and space power re sides in all the serv ices, the US Air Force is the lead service for employ ing this capa bil ity. Hence, its vision and planning for the future will be used in this discus sion.
This new vision details how the US Air Force fits into the na tional se cu rity strat egy of "En gage ment and Enlarge ment" and the na tional mili tary strat egy (NMS). The NMS cen ters around two major concepts to meet the se cu rity chal lenges of the new cen tury: global pres ence and power projec tion. Since these chal lenges will occur across a wide range of con tin gen cies, the joint force commander will demand flexible capa bili ties. The Air Force contrib utes these capa bili ties to the joint team through its "core com pe ten cies" of air and space supe ri or ity, global attack, preci sion en gage ment, rapid global mo bil ity, ag ile com bat sup port, and in for ma tion su pe ri or ity. For mer secre tary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall points out that coping with the new chal lenges and their effect on the battle field "was no acci dent." The Air Force antici pated this new way of war because "of vision, sys tem atic plan ning and in vest ing in our peo ple, and the right moderni za tion programs."
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The Airpower TrinityMaintaining the Balance Main tain ing the balance in the Airpower Trin ity requires delib er ate planning and exe cu tion. Vi sion has been the word used in most of the documents relat ing to future opera tions. Vision is not ex actly the same as the ory, but for the purposes of project ing the future, the airpower advo cates of today-our airpower theorists-use vi sion to explain what air power hopes to do for warfare. This is where vi sion (the ory) pushes tech nol ogy to pro duce the neces sary capa bil ity, but this vision is possi ble only when the advo cates have some glimpse of the "art of the possi ble."
For exam ple, with such a glimpse, the authors of Bat tle field of the Future: 21st Cen tury Warfare Issues iden ti fied four new po ten tial warfare areas: space warfare, preci sion strike, dominat ing maneu ver, and infor ma tion warfare. 33 Space warfare, by exten sion, is in airpow er's domain (more specifi cally, air and space power's domain in the future). George Friedman, who heads the Strate gic Fore cast ing Group, ar gues in his book The Fu ture of War that "the age of the gun is over and the future is the age of precision-guided mu ni tions or smart weapons. He who controls space controls the battle field." He adds that the United States will have the edge in the twenty-first century due to high-speed mis siles and space-based recon nais sance to gather infor ma tion and quickly dissemi nate it. 34 Preci sion strike, dominat ing maneu ver, and infor ma tion warfare are not the sole domain of airpower; however, airpower will play a sig nifi cant role in each and a ma jor role in the preci sion strike area. While all of these ar eas are supported by the core compe ten cies of the US Air Force, preci sion strike is the far thest along con cep tu ally and prac ti cally. This al lows a look at the future poten tial of airpower from the famil iar perspec tive of the pres ent.
By 2020, new tech nolo gies that will en able pre ci sion strike could provide command ers with "wide-area surveil lance and target ac qui si tion, near-real-time respon sive ness, and highly accu rate, long-range weapons" to achieve strate gic effects at inter con ti nen tal dis tances. 35 This will be a dra matic in crease in ca pa bil ity. In 1943, the US Eighth Air Force prose cuted only 50 strate gic targets in an entire year. In the first 24 hours of De sert Storm, the coali tion air forces prose cuted 150 stra te gic targets. By the year 2020, the poten tial could exist to prosecute five hundred strate gic targets in the first minute of a war. 36 This ac com plish ment will come only from the syn er gis tic effect of linking the technolo gies re quired in all of these new war fare ar eas. For air power to live up to its poten tial in this vi sion of warfare, tech nol ogy will have to pro duce the neces sary capa bili ties. It seems the tech no logi cal advance ments, thus far, make that highly probable.
These current techno logi cal advance ments are so rapid and dramatic, a poten tial prob lem is that employ ment practices may not be able to keep up with that pace. Since the "cause and effect" rela tion ship discussed ear lier between the ory and tech nol ogy keeps these two elements more closely in balance, the more criti cal re la tion ship is be tween tech nol ogy and prac tice. And tech nol ogy will be the driver in this rela tion ship. The devel op ment of employ ment prac ticesto take advan tage of this ad vanced tech nol ogy will be re quired for air power to make the vi sion a real ity. Conse quently, new opera tional concepts and orga nizational modifi ca tions may provide greater lev er age for future success than the techno logi cally advanced systems themselves.
As the fu ture bat tle space be comes more le thal and complex, the technolo gies required to survive in this envi ron ment will likely re sult in systems that are not compati ble with manned flight. New op era tional con cepts will in creas ingly employ unmanned systems to re duce the loss of life, to utilize technolo gies that exceed the limits of human capa bil ity, and to meet sig na ture re quire ments in a more stealth-necessary en vi ron ment. The or gan iza tional modifi ca tions required to opera tion al ize these concepts have already begun in the US Air Force. The first unmanned aerial vehi cle (UAV) squadron has been estab lished at Nel lis AFB, Nevada. The estab lish ment of the squad ron and the loca tion are signifi cant because this or gan iza tional modi fi ca tion strikes di rectly at the heart of the founding identity of the US Air Force: the pilot in the cockpit (with a scarf flowing in the breeze). Not only will this challenge the core insti tu tional cul ture, it will challenge the warrior ethos. 37 How ironic that the first UAV squadron is at Nel lis AFB, the "home of the fighter pilot." The devel op ment of UAV technol ogy and prac tices is an ex am ple of where con certed ef fort, planning, and leader ship will be re quired to keep the Airpower Trinity in bal ance.
Conclusion
The syner gis tic evolu tion of three key ele ments-the ory, technol ogy, and prac tice-is criti cal to the evolu tion of airpower in order to achieve its maximum combat poten tial. This is the essence of airpower-a force that can provide a de ci sive fac tor to the out come of con flict. This arti cle intro duced the Airpower Trinity, origi nat ing from the con cept of the Clau ze witz ian Trinity with his "three magnets balanc ing the trin ity." This new con struct ex plores the rela tion ship of the ory, technol ogy, and prac tice to the es sence of air power. As in the Clause witz ian Trin ity, the inter ac tion among these elements must pro duce a bal ance of the Air power Trin ity.
